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Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals 1 
Formally-inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents--agents who 
exemplify rational ideals, such as probabilistic coherence, that human beings could never fully 
realize.  This approach can be defended against the well-know worry that abstracting from 
human cognitive imperfections deprives the approach of interest.  But a different worry arises 
when we ask what an ideal agent should believe about her own cognitive perfection (even an 
agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact). 
Consideration of this question reveals an interesting feature of the structure of our epistemic 
ideals: for agents with limited information, our epistemic ideals turn out to conflict with one 
another.  This suggests that we must revise the way we see ideal agents in epistemic theorizing. 
1. Ideal vs. Human-centric Rationality
What would an ideally rational agent believe?  Of course, the answer depends on just what kind 
of ideally rational agent is in question.  But when epistemologists consider this question, they 
don’t simply answer “everything true”.  Rationality, after all, involves reacting correctly to the 
evidence one has, but does not seem to require having all possible evidence about everything. 
Thus if we seek to understand rationality by constructing a model of ideally rational belief, we 
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will not concentrate on an omniscient being.  Instead, we’ll consider a non-omniscient thinker 
who nevertheless is in certain respects cognitively perfect.  We might, for example, stipulate the 
following kinds of things about such an ideally rational agent’s beliefs: They would not be based 
in wishful thinking.  They would be independent of the agent’s likes and dislikes.  They would 
respect whatever evidence the agent had.  And they would respect the logical relations among 
claims the agent had beliefs about.  Let us call a non-omniscient agent who nevertheless is 
ideally rational an IRA.
2
 
This general approach to theorizing about rationality dovetails nicely with the tradition 
which relates rationality to thinking logically, and then characterizes rational belief with the aid 
of formal logic.   Those who see belief as a binary, all-or-nothing, kind of state have thus often 
taken logical consistency and logical closure to be rational ideals.  And those who conceive of 
beliefs as coming in degrees have taken conditions based on probabilistic coherence--which can 
be seen as little more than applying standard deductive logic to graded beliefs--as ideals.
3
 
Of course, this whole formal approach to thinking about rationality has been criticized.  
The main line of criticism takes off from the fact that ideals such as logical consistency or 
probabilistic coherence are very clearly far beyond the capacities of any human to achieve--even 
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more so than complete freedom from prejudice or wishful thinking.  Such ideals require, for 
instance, that an agent believe (or, in the case of coherence conditions, be completely certain of) 
every logical truth. Why then, it is asked, should rules that might apply to a peculiar sort of 
imaginary beings--ideal thinkers with limited information--have any bearing on us?  The fact 
that we humans have the particular limitations we do, it is urged, is not just some trivial footnote 
to epistemology; it’s a central aspect of our epistemic predicament.  Interesting 
epistemology--epistemology for humans--must take account of this fact.
4
 
I think that this line of criticism should be resisted.  While there are certainly some 
projects in epistemology that must take careful account of human limitations, they do not exhaust 
interesting epistemology.
5
  For example, if one’s epistemological project were to characterize 
our ordinary, casual way of using the words “rational” and “irrational” to apply to people, then it 
might be hard to see how humanly unattainable ideals would play an important role: everyone 
fails to live up to humanly unattainable ideals, but we obviously don’t call everyone “irrational”.  
But there’s little reason to think that epistemology should be restricted to such a thin notion of 
rationality.  (Similarly, ethics should not be restricted to studying moral ideals that are perfectly 
attained by the ordinary people we’d hesitate to call “immoral.”) 
A related point applies to the project of developing a notion of rationality that’s closely 
linked to an “ought”-implies-“can” notion of epistemic responsibility.  Clearly, we don’t want to 
blame anyone for failing to live up to an unattainable ideal.  But there are certainly evaluative 
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notions that are not subject to “ought”-implies-“can”.  I would argue that our ordinary notion of 
rationality is one of them: when we call a paranoid schizophrenic “irrational”, we in no sense 
imply that he has the ability to do better.
6
 
Another epistemic enterprise in which the importance of highly idealized models might 
be questioned is the so-called “meliorative project”--epistemology aimed at our cognitive 
improvement.  Some have claimed that any interesting epistemology must be aimed at providing 
us with guidance to help ourselves (or perhaps others) to think better.  I personally doubt that 
philosophers are particularly well-equipped for this sort of endeavor.  But even putting that 
doubt aside, I see no reason to think that the sole point of epistemology should be the production 
of manuals for cognitive self-help.
7
 
What projects are there, then, which make manifestly unattainable epistemic ideals worth 
studying?  One such project is that of assessing us as a species.  After all, there is no reason to 
suppose--even if we are the cognitive cream of the mammalian crop--that we’re the be-all and 
end-all of any evaluative epistemic notion we come up with.  Indexing epistemic perfection to 
the cognitive capacities of homo sapiens clearly begs some interesting questions. 
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clear that our ordinary rationality judgments are based in assessments of peoples’ levels of 




well be ones whose extremes are beyond human reach.  Freedom from wishful thinking is a 
plausible example.  Predicting consequences of social policies in a way that’s untainted by 
self-interest is another.  More examples include evaluating other people’s behavior and character 
without prejudice from emotional ties, or from bigotry based on race or sexual orientation.  And 
a natural candidate for this list is having beliefs that do not violate logic. 
If rationality consists (at least partly) in good performance along this sort of dimension, 
then one natural approach to understanding rationality more clearly is to study candidates for 
rationality-making qualities by abstracting away from human cognitive limitations, and 
considering idealized agents who can perfectly exemplify the qualities under consideration.  Is 
logical consistency of all-or-nothing belief a rational desideratum?  What about probabilistic 
coherence of degrees of confidence?  How should agents update their beliefs when presented 
with new evidence?  It seems that questions like these may be approached, at least in part, by 
asking ourselves, “What would an IRA believe?” 
Now it is important to see that the suggestion here is not that questions about rational 
ideals reduce to questions about what ideal agents would believe.  Any such reduction would 
likely run afoul of immediate counterexamples involving, e.g., beliefs about the existence of 
ideally rational agents.
8
  For example, it might be the case that any ideally rational agent would 
be quite confident that there were conscious beings who could not remember making any 
cognitive errors; this does nothing to show that such a belief is rationally mandatory in general.  
But this sort of problem does not, I think, undermine the usefulness of IRAs in studying 




beliefs which help make it ideally rational, and those that are mere side-effects of the 
idealization.   
It might be insisted that we must still connect considerations about IRAs with claims 
about us non-ideal agents.  However, there are simple, plausible ways of doing this.  For 
example, one attractive thought is that if the constraints that apply to IRAs describe the endpoint 
of a spectrum, then the closer an actual agent’s beliefs are to that end of the spectrum, the better 
(presumably, ceteris paribus).  Efficiency in cars is a nice analogue here: perfect efficiency is 
impossible, but (ceteris paribus) the more closely one approaches this end, the better.  Moral 
principles also might work this way: I am undoubtedly psychologically incapable of being 
perfectly fair or generous; but the more closely I approximate perfect fairness and generosity, 
ceteris paribus, the better.
9
 
To my mind, some of the most promising applications of highly idealized theorizing 
about rationality involve taking probabilistic coherence as a constraint on degrees of belief.  
Considerations along the lines rehearsed above, I think, show that some of the most common 
objections to idealizations involving probabilistic coherence, on the grounds that they abstract so 
far from human limitations, are misguided.  I would like, then, to say something like: “Well, of 
course none of us can be probabilistically coherent, but that’s no big deal.  We can see that 
coherence is an ideal in part by showing that IRAs have coherent credences.  And as far as my 
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own beliefs are concerned, the closer I can come to having coherent credences, the more rational 
my beliefs will be.”
10
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 This thought presupposes that we can make sense of one’s beliefs coming closer to 
coherence.  Zynda (1996) develops a way of making sense of this notion in order to give 
normative force to the unrealizable ideal of coherence. 
Unfortunately, I now think that the claim that IRAs are coherent is probably false, and 
that the claim about the rationality of approaching coherence in my own beliefs is at least 
problematic.  The reasons for this are related to, but ultimately quite different from, the worries 
about idealization described above.  They raise what seems to me an interestingly different 
difficulty for the standard way of using ideal agents in theorizing about rationality, a difficulty 
flowing from the structure of our epistemic ideals.  
 
2. Ideal Rationality Meets Possible Cognitive Imperfection 
The problem I would like to examine involves a very different way in which cognitive 
imperfection poses an obstacle to taking probabilistic coherence as a rational ideal.  The 
problem arises from an agent’s apparently rational reflection on her own beliefs.  Let us begin by 
thinking about a case involving a clearly non-ideal agent: 
Suppose I prove a somewhat complex theorem of logic.  I’ve checked the proof several 
times, and I’m extremely confident about it.  Still, it might seem quite reasonable for me to be 
somewhat less than 100% confident.  I should not, for example, bet my house against a nickel 
that the proof is correct.  After all, balancing my checkbook has shown me quite clearly that my 
going over a demonstrative argument, even repeatedly, is not sure proof against error.  Given my 




deny that I should give it some nonzero credence.  Let us call the theorem I’ve proved T.  And 
let us use M to denote the claim that in believing T, I’ve come to believe a false claim due to a 
cognitive mistake.  The question now arises: given this sort of doubt, how strongly--ideally 
speaking--should I believe T? 
It seems that my giving some slight credence to M is required by my recognition that I 
may sometimes exhibit cognitive imperfection.  And to the extent that I have any rational 
credence at all in M, I must have some rational credence in the negation of T (since M obviously 
entails ~T).  So my confidence in T should fall short of absolute certainty; in probabilistic terms, 
it should be less than 1. 
But if something like this is correct, it seems to raise an obstacle to taking coherence as a 
rational ideal for me--an obstacle quite different from that raised by the fact that coherence is 
humanly unattainable.  For according to this argument, it would not be rational for me to have 
full confidence in T, a truth of logic.  In fact, if I did manage to have the coherence-mandated 
attitude toward T, the argument would urge me to back away from it.  So the problem is not the 
usual one cited in connection with human cognitive limitations.  It’s not that I can’t achieve the 
probabilistically correct attitude toward T--in this case, I may well be perfectly capable of that.  
The problem is that, in the present case, it seems that my beliefs would be worse--less rational--if 
I were to adopt the attitude toward T that’s mandated by probabilistic coherence. 
It is worth pointing out that the problem is not just about having maximal belief in logical 
truths.  To see this, suppose I give some positive credence to ~T.  Now consider what credence 
I should give to (~T v C), for some ordinary contingent claim C.  If it is different from my 




logically equivalent claims get equal credence.  On the other hand, if my credence in (~T v C) is 
equal to my credence in C, then I will violate the principle that my credence in a disjunction of 
logically incompatible disjuncts should be the sum of my credences in the disjuncts. 
The basic problem is that coherence puts constraints on my credences based on the logical 
relations among all the claims in which I have credences--including contingent claims.  To the 
extent that I have doubts about whether certain logical relations hold, and to the extent that those 
doubts are reflected in my credences, coherence may be violated--even when explicit 
consideration of logical truths is not involved.  For another example, suppose that contingent 
claim P logically entails contingent claim Q, but I am not absolutely certain of this.  In at least 
some such cases, it would seem that I should then have somewhat higher credence in P than in (P 
& Q).  But if I do, then again I have given logically equivalent contingent claims different levels 
of credence. 
Clearly, this problem should be disconcerting to those of us who would advocate 
coherence--either the simple version, or one of the standard generalizations--as a component of 
ideal rationality.  To my mind, the threat it poses is significantly deeper than that posed by the 
fact that probabilistic perfection is not humanly possible.  Thus it’s worthwhile seeing whether 
the one might resist the claim that it would be irrational for me to be coherent. 
 
3. Can I Rationally be Certain of T? 
Suppose one were to argue as follows: 
Certainty Argument: Granted, I must give ~T at least as much credence as I give to M.  




demonstratively.  So I should give it full confidence, and should give ~T, and thus M, zero 
credence.  (After all, my proof of T serves as a proof of not-M!)  I may not be a perfect being, 
but I have the best possible reason for believing T, and thus the best possible reasons for being 
certain that I haven’t come to believe a false claim due to a cognitive mistake. 
I think that this argument should not tempt us.  To see why, suppose that I work out my 
proof of T after having coffee with my friend Jocko.  Palms sweaty with the excitement of 
logical progress, I check my work several times, and decide that the proof is good.  But then a 
trusted colleague walks in and tells me that Jocko has been surreptitiously slipping a 
reason-distorting drug into people’s coffee--a drug whose effects include a strong propensity to 
reasoning errors in 99% of those who have been dosed (1% of the population happen to be 
immune).  He tells me that those who have been impaired do not notice any difficulties with 
their own cognition--they just make mistakes; indeed, the only change most of them notice is 
unusually sweaty palms.  Here, my reason for doubting my proof, and the truth of T, is much 
stronger.  It seems clear that in the presence of these strong reasons for doubt, it would be highly 
irrational for me to maintain absolute confidence in T.  Yet the certainty argument would, if 
sound, seem to apply equally to such extreme cases. 
Could this verdict possibly be resisted?  Could one argue that, initial appearances to the 
contrary, we actually can embrace the certainty argument, even in the strong doubt case?  One 
way of attempting this would capitalize on distinguishing carefully between two sorts of cases: 
the bad ones, where the drug has impaired my reasoning and my proof is defective, and the good 
ones, in which I’m one of the lucky 1% who is immune to the drug’s effects and my proof is 




person in the bad case would be irrational for someone in the good case.  After all, those in the 
good case have constructed flawless sound proofs of T, and those in the bad case have made 
errors in reasoning.  To say that what holds for one must hold for the other would be to conflate 
having a correct proof with seeming to oneself to have a correct proof.  So it might be argued 
that although it would be clearly wrong for most people who find out that they’ve been dosed to 
dismiss the resulting doubts, at least if I am in the good case, I am in a different epistemic 
position, and I may rationally dismiss the doubts.
11
 
Now I think that there is something to this point.  I would not claim that the epistemic 
situations of the drug-sensitive person and the immune person are fully symmetrical.  After all, 
the drug-sensitive person in the envisioned type of situation makes a mistake in reasoning even 
before she finds out about the drug, and the drug-immune person does not.  But granting the 
existence of an asymmetry here does not mean that it is rational for the drug-immune person to 
disregard the evidence suggesting that he has made an error.  And it seems clear--especially 
when one keeps in mind that those who are affected by the drug don’t notice any impairment in 
their reasoning--that given the evidence suggesting I’ve made a mistake, it would be irrational for 
me to maintain full confidence in my reasoning, even if I happen to be in the good case.
12
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Argument even to the original cases involving mild self-doubts raised by memories of 
misadventures in checkbook balancing.  Nothing in the Certainty Argument hinged on the 
mildness of the doubt about my proof. In fact, it does not seem that even the weak positive 
reasons for doubt provided by the checkbook-balancing memories are needed to prove the point.  
Suppose I’ve never made a mistake in balancing my checkbook or in any other demonstrative 
reasoning.  Surely that doesn’t license me in being certain that such mistakes are impossible.  
And as long as such mistakes are possible, it is hard to see how I can be certain that they have not 
occurred.  Even if my reason for doubt is slight, and, so to speak, metaphysical--so slight that in 
ordinary cases, I wouldn’t bother to think about it--still, it would seem irrational to be absolutely 
certain that I had not come to believe a false claim due to a cognitive mistake.  And thus it 
would seem irrational for me to be absolutely certain of T.  
If this is right, it underlies a troubling result for those of us who see coherence as a 
rational ideal.  For the only way I can live up to the ideal of coherence here would seem to be by 
irrationally dismissing  the possibility that a cognitive mistake led me to believe T falsely.  
Being certain of logical truths seems not only to be something that I can’t always do--it seems 
like something I often shouldn’t do.  And that makes it hard to see what kind of an epistemic 
ideal probabilistic coherence could be. 
 
4. Would an Ideally Rational Agent be certain of her own ideality? 
The troubling result flows from the fact that I must believe myself to be epistemically fallible.  
But if rational ideals can be thought of as those that would make an ideal agent’s beliefs rational, 




make a cognitive error, but would also (rationally) be certain her own cognitive perfection.  If 
that were so, then we could at least hold that an IRA would have probabilistically coherent 
beliefs.  And this might help explain a sense in which coherence was, after all, an epistemic 
ideal.  The idea would be something like this: my self-doubts, which prevent me from rationally 
being certain of T, are a distracting byproduct of my fallen epistemic state.  Consideration of 
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 I should note that would not solve the whole problem.  We would still need to say 
something about how ideals that apply to such imaginary agents would relate to rationality 
assessments for humans.  Clearly, this task is complicated if we acknowledge that an ideal for 
the imaginary agent is one which, at least in some cases, it would be worse for a human agent to 
approach.  I’ll return to this issue below. 
It has been claimed that ideal agents have this sort of self-confidence.  Jordan Howard 
Sobel (1987) argues that what he calls “ideal intellects” not only are probabilistically coherent, 
but display a number of other features as well:  They are always absolutely certain, and correct, 
about their own credences.   They have the sort of trust in their future credences that is 
embodied in van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection.  And they are absolutely certain that they 
are probabilistically coherent.  Thus an ideal intellect would not only be absolutely certain of 
T--she’d also have the sort of high intellectual self-opinion that would seem to be needed to be 




Sobel defends this conception of an ideal intellect as embodying a kind of full integration 
and self-possession.  He also notes that violation of the ideals can leave an agent open to 
guaranteed betting losses similar to those that figure in standard Dutch Book arguments.  For 
example, suppose an agent doubts (however slightly) that she’s perfectly coherent.  If the agent’s 
doubt is realized--that is, if she is actually incoherent--then she is of course susceptible to a 
classic Dutch Book.  But suppose that the agent is actually coherent; she just isn’t completely 
confident that she is.  Such an agent will accept a bet in which she will pay the bookie some 
amount--say $X--if she’s coherent, as long as the bookie agrees to pay her enough if she’s 
incoherent.  The agent will lose $X on this bet, and the bookie can determine this fact merely by 
consulting the agent’s credences.  Thus, as in the standard Dutch Book argument, the bookie can 
take advantage of the agent by knowing nothing except the agent’s credences.
14
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As noted above, an IRA, as usually conceived of in theorizing about rationality, is quite 
different from an omniscient god.  The IRA reasons perfectly, and is thus logically omniscient 
(or at least logically infallible)
15
, but the IRA is not assumed to be factually omniscient.  This 
conception of an IRA carries with it no obvious presumption that an IRA would know that she 
was ideally rational.  For such an agent to be rationally confident that she  was ideally rational, 
it would seem that some sort of warrant would be required.  But while it seems likely that many 
IRAs would have excellent evidence of their rational prowess, it also seems unlikely that all of 
them (or perhaps any of them) could be rationally certain of their own rational ideality. 
If an IRA had been around for a long time, and if she had a good memory, she might well 
have evidence that she possessed an excellent epistemic track record.  Unlike most of us, she 
would never have been corrected for a cognitive error.  But it’s hard to see how even a very long 
and distinguished epistemic history could justify the sort of absolute self-confidence at issue 
here.  For it’s clearly possible for an agent to think flawlessly up until time t, and then to make a 
mistake.  Clearly, a spotless record up until time t does nothing to tell against this particular 
possibility. 
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easy to tell introspectively that one is epistemically impaired.  But not all impairments are 
evident in this way (and even if they were, there’s no reason to think that all possible 
impairments would be).  So the fact that an agent seems to herself to be thinking with perfect 
lucidity could hardly justify absolute epistemic self-confidence.  
It might also be held that some sort of first-person presumption of rationality must exist 
which is independent of any reliance on introspection, or on the sort of evidence one might use in 
making third-person assessments of rationality.  Such a presumption might be argued not to 
need justification by anything else.  I do not aim to dispute this sort of claim here.  I would only 
insist that any such presumption would have to fall far short of rendering rational an agent’s 
absolute confidence that she was absolutely logically inerrant. 
What should we think about the argument showing that an agent who doubts her own 
coherence is vulnerable to guaranteed betting losses?  I think that on closer inspection, it turns 
out to be unpersuasive.  Note that in the standard Dutch Book arguments, the bookie offers the 
agent a set of bets with two properties: (1) the agent finds each bet in the set fair, and (2) the set 
of bets taken together is logically guaranteed to result in a net loss (for the agent’s side of the 
bets).   The existence of a set of bets with these two properties is the crux of the argument; the 
imagined bookie adds only entertainment value.  In the present argument, if the agent is actually 
coherent but is not fully confident of this fact, the set of bets the bookie would offer pays the 
bookie only because it includes a bet which pays him if the agent is coherent.  Although the 
agent would indeed lose money on this set of bets in the actual world--since she is in fact 
coherent--it is not a set of bets which is logically guaranteed to result in a loss for the agent.  The 




the agent has coherent credences.  So it seems that this guaranteed betting loss is more an 
artefact of the betting situation than an indication of any rational defect on the agent’s part. 
For all of these reasons, it seems unlikely that an IRA would be rationally certain of her 
own cognitive perfection.  And these considerations also raise an obstacle to arguing that 
extreme self-confidence flows from a sort of ideal integration or self-possession that 
characterizes ideally rational intellects.  Even if one found this line persuasive in isolation, the 
considerations above suggest that such extreme self-confidence would be inconsistent with what 
is clearly central to our conception of an IRA: not having irrationally held beliefs. 
 
5. Can an Ideally Rational Agent be certain of T? 
It might be objected, however, that the whole line of argument in the previous section is 
misdirected.  After all, what’s directly at issue in our example is just whether the IRA can 
rationally be certain of ~M.  The broader claim discussed above, which concerns the agent’s 
own general rational perfection, is clearly a logically contingent proposition.  But ~M follows 
from T--it’s a truth of logic!  So the fact that the IRA can’t rationally be certain that she never 
makes logical errors is simply irrelevant.  The IRA has solid a priori reason to be certain that in 
believing that T, she isn’t believing a falsehood.  No reliance on track records or introspection is 
required. 
Although this argument rightly points out a disanalogy between ~M and general 
epistemic self-confidence, it seems to me that the disanalogy will not suffice for the use to which 
the argument would put it.  We should first note in general that the fact that an agent has a priori 




by a posteriori considerations.  If it did, then that even in the case where Jocko tells me that he 
drugged my coffee, I would be justified in continuing to believe T.  But given that even a priori 
justifications are vulnerable in this way, it’s not clear why the IRA’s justification for being 
absolutely confident in T wouldn’t be undermined by any general uncertainty she had about her 
own cognitive perfection. 
We can see this point from a different angle by supposing, as the objection urges, that the 
IRA may be uncertain of her own logical prowess, while nevertheless being fully certain of both 
T and ~M.   To begin with, let’s consider a case in which the IRA, though actually cognitively 
perfect, doesn’t have much confidence at all that she is ultra-reliable when she becomes certain 
of apparent theorems--let’s say she has never checked her theorem-detection by consulting 
external sources, or even by reconsidering the apparent theorems she has come to believe.  
Suppose that this moderate self-assessment is rational.  Can such an agent nevertheless be 
rationally certain of T and ~M?   
It seems to me unlikely that this will be rational.  If the agent can be rationally certain of 
T and ~M, she presumably can perform similar feats a great many times--there is nothing special 
about T.  So for all of the apparent theorems (say T1 - T10,000) the agent considers, she may 
rationally be certain of the corresponding propositions (~M1 - ~M10,000), each denying that she 
has mistakenly come to believe a falsehood.   Assuming that the agent can keep track of what 
theorems she has become certain of, she would then seem to have excellent reason to think that 
she has become certain of 10,000 theorems in a row, without once accepting a false one due to 
cognitive error.  But for the IRA to accomplish this feat without having extraordinary 




have to be extremely lucky (avoiding cognitive errors by sheer luck, or only making cognitive 
errors that happened not to result in believing false claims), or perhaps be guided by some other 
force which did have extraordinary powers of theorem-recognition.  However, it is hard to see 
how the fact that an agent is an IRA--the fact that she never does makes a logical mistake--would 
make it rational for the agent to be at all sure that, insofar as her theorem-recognition abilities 
might have fallen short, extraordinary luck or guidance resulted in her correctly assessing 10,000 
theorems in a row.  So it’s hard to see why we should think that an IRA could be rationally 
certain of ~M1 - ~M10,000 while being only moderately confident in her own theorem-recognition 
ability. 
Could the agent’s confidence in T1 - T10,000  make it rational for the agent to have a high 
degree of confidence that she had extraordinary theorem-proving power?  I don’t think so.   
This would be like an agent consulting the gas gauge in her car to determine both the level of fuel 
and what the gas gauge read, and using the resulting beliefs to rationalize confidence that the 
gauge was accurate; or looking at a series of colored squares to determine both what color the 
squares were and how they looked, and using that to make rational her confidence that her color 
vision was accurate.  If the agent begins with a rational moderate degree of confidence in her 
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 This argument is adapted from arguments given in a different context by Richard 
Fumerton (1995, 173ff) Jonathan Vogel (2000) and Stewart Cohen(2002).  
 I should note that the argument does not  presuppose that the IRA could not get any 
track-record-type evidence of her own reliability.  It’s just that any such evidence would depend 
on some way of checking the IRA’s proofs.  So if others checked the proofs and agreed with 




Would our verdict change if the agent’s confidence in her own cognitive perfection were 
short of certainty, but very high rather than moderate?  I think not.  For the question is whether 
the agent can rationally be absolutely certain of the results of her theorem-consideration.  Once 
we see how rational confidence in T is undermined by an agent’s moderate views about her own 
cognitive perfection, it seems clear that even very small doubts about her own cognitive 
perfection should have some effect in limiting the confidence that it is rational for that agent to 
have in T.  
The problem is just a reflection of the basic fact that lies behind all of the examples we’ve 
looked at: that the rationality of first-order beliefs cannot in general be divorced from the 
rationality of certain second-order beliefs that bear on the epistemic status of those first-order 
beliefs.  This is the reason that, in the case of an ordinary person who has proved a theorem, 
empirical evidence about being drugged in certain ways can undermine a belief whose 
justification was purely logical.  Thinking about ~M1 - ~M10,000 is simply a way of amplifying a 
point that applied to the original ~M: that insofar as an agent is not absolutely confident in her 
own logical faculties, it is likely to be irrational for her to be absolutely confident in particular 
beliefs delivered by those faculties.
17
 
                                                                                                                                                             
made multiple attempts to prove the same sentences and got consistent results, that would count 
for something--after all, there would be some possibility that the IRA could get something other 
than confirming evidence.  The problem with the procedure envisioned is that it completely begs 
the question of the IRA’s theorem-proving accuracy. 
17
 This suggests that even if one doesn’t harbor doubts about distinguishing logical truths 
from factual ones, there will still be a sense in which our knowledge of logical truths gets 





Does this point apply to even the most simple and obviously self-evident-seeming 
beliefs?  If not, there may be a different way to argue that the IRA would have full confidence in 
~M1 - ~M10,000.  Consider a logical truth that, to us, is maximally obvious--say, 
T’: Everything is self-identical. 
Even if it were granted that we would be irrational to place full confidence in complex logical 
theorems, it might be claimed that we should at least be able to be absolutely confident in claims 
such as T’.  And if so, we ought to be able to have full rational confidence in the negation of 
M’: In believing that everything is self-identical, I’m believing a false claim due to a 
cognitive mistake. 
But the IRA, it might well be argued, would experience all logical truths, including T1 - T10,000, as 
being just as self-evident as T’.  So it would, after all, be rational for such a being to be 
completely certain of ~M1 - ~M10,000.  The apparent problem arises only if we’re misled by 
ignoring the IRA’s superior ability to see clearly and distinctly in cases where we cannot. 
It seems to me that this strategy for supporting the IRA’s certainty about ~M1 - ~M10,000 
will not work.  For even if we grant that all theorems are as simple and obviously self-evident to 
her as T’ is to us, I doubt that the obviousness or self-evidence of T’ licences us in being 
absolutely certain of ~M’.  Even if there were some special way of seeing clearly and distinctly 
that occurs when I contemplate claims like T’, I don’t think I can rationally be absolutely certain 
that no drug or demon could make it seem to me that I’m seeing clearly and distinctly when in 
fact I’m contemplating a falsity.  And to the extent that I cannot absolutely preclude that 
possibility of M’, I fall short of rational absolute certainty in T’.  For similar reasons, even if all 




that her cognitive process have misfired or been interfered with in a way that allows some 
falsehoods to seem self-evidently true.  Thus it seems to me that the IRA cannot rationally be 
absolutely certain of ~M1 - ~M10,000, and thus she cannot rationally be absolutely certain of T1 - 
T10,00. 
If the argument of the last two sections is right, then, we are faced with the following sort 
of problem: given that an agent has the sort of limited evidence IRAs have typically been taken to 
have, it turns out that there is a tension among three prima facie appealing (though, admittedly, 
loosely formulated) rational ideals. 
1. (LOGIC) An agent’s beliefs must respect logic by satisfying (some version of) 
probabilistic coherence. 
2. (EVIDENCE) An agent’s beliefs (at least about logically contingent matters) must be 
proportioned to the agent’s evidence. 
3. (INTEGRATION) An agent’s object-level beliefs must reflect the agent’s meta-level 
beliefs about the reliability of the cognitive processes underlying her object-level 
beliefs. 
The problem we saw was that if a standard IRA satisfied (LOGIC) with respect to her beliefs 
about theorems, and (EVIDENCE) with respect to her beliefs about the reliability of her own 
cognitive processes, she could not respect (INTEGRATION) with respect to the connections 
between these two kinds of beliefs. 
There are several different reactions possible here.  One could of course take the problem 
as showing that there’s something wrong with at least one of the purported rational ideals--at 




I’d like to explore two other options.  The first is to trace the problem to the peculiarities of the 
standard kind of IRA that I’ve been discussing, and to avoid the problem by considering a 
different kind of ideally rational agent.  The second is to develop a revised understanding of the 
use of ideal agents in theorizing about rationality.  I’ll discuss these in the next two sections. 
 
6. Can Variant Ideal Agents Avoid the Tension? 
If the conflict among the three principles arises only because we are taking our IRA to 
have incomplete evidence, might we avoid the whole problem by simply dropping this 
assumption?  After all, God, on some standard conceptions, is an agent who is not only perfectly 
rational, but also perfectly informed.  It can be hard to understand how God knows things--it 
would seem that nothing like our ordinary sources of empirical evidence would be necessary (or, 
really, of any use at all) for God’s omniscience.  For my part, I’m not at all sure that it finally 
makes sense that God could be rationally certain of all truths.  But perhaps it does, and if there 
were such a being, we’ve seen no reason to think that She would have trouble simultaneously 
satisfying our three principles. 
Now I don’t want to explore the tenability of supposing that an omniscient being could 
rationally be certain of her own rational perfection.  For in any case, it seems to me that we 
cannot simply sidestep our problem by investigating ideal rationality with reference to the beliefs 
of such a being.  A central component of epistemic rationality is having beliefs appropriate to 
incomplete information.  A godlike agent’s credences would presumably simply mirror the 




no intermediate degrees of belief at all.
18
  Thus such a model would tell us nothing about a 
central component of epistemic rationality--the sort of component that’s in part captured by 
something like (EVIDENCE).  A useful model of epistemic rationality cannot simply collapse 
rational belief into truth. 
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 At least in propositions that have truth values.  If, e.g., certain propositions about the 
future don’t have truth values, then even God can’t know them. 
Might there be a non-omniscient ideal agent who could yet be sufficiently free of rational 
self-doubt to satisfy the three principles?  If not, we’d have an argument that rational perfection 
required factual omniscience.  This would, I think, be quite a surprising result.  As noted at the 
outset, rationality seems to be a notion designed in part to abstract from well-informedness.  We 
certainly don’t see ordinary cases in which a person lacks information as constituting any sort of 
lapse in rationality.  So it would be surprising that although each of our rational principles seems 
to be aimed at capturing some aspect of thinking well, and not at some aspect of being 
well-informed, the three principles together required factual omniscience for their joint 
satisfaction.  On the surface, though, what would be required to satisfy the principles would not 
be omniscience.  We’ve seen that the agent would need to be absolutely certain that she had not 
been led by cognitive mishaps to err in believing any of T1 - T10,000, but this does not obviously 
imply anything about the agent’s confidence about, e.g., the number of stars in the Milky Way.  
So it is not clear to me that only an omniscient being could satisfy the three principles. 
Nevertheless, it is also not clear that there is any reasonably neat way of describing an 
agent whose epistemic powers are less than an omniscient god’s, yet who could rationally 




confidence in the theorems she accepted.  Without some clear conception of the epistemic 
resources such a being would have to have, it’s not clear whether she would serve as a useful 
model for studying principles of rationality.  At this point, then, I don’t see a way of using a 
super-knowledgeable variant of the standard IRA to study rational ideals in a context where they 
don’t conflict. 
Another way of altering the standard IRA to avoid the tension among the three principles 
would be to think of an IRA which had no self-doubts because she was completely devoid of 
beliefs about herself–or, at least, about her own beliefs.  After all, it is only when the agent 
begins to reflect on the possibility of her own epistemic imperfection that the problem seems to 
arise.  Perhaps, instead of imagining an IRA who rationally rejects possibilities of her own error, 
we could conceive of an IRA who simply never entertains them in the first place. 
Again, the question that naturally arises is whether such an agent could be ideally 
rational.  After all, it is not in general rational for an agent to ignore empirical possibilities that 
bear on the truth of her beliefs.  Consider, for example, an ordinary agent who is absolutely 
certain that it’s four o’clock, because her watch reads four o’clock and she hasn’t ever considered 
the possibility that her watch is inaccurate.   In this case, it’s clear that her absolute confidence 
betrays a rational failing. Perhaps a closer analogy to our case would be an agent who completely 
trusted her visual perception, and ignored the possibility that things weren’t quite as they 
appeared.  Even an agent who had never seen a mirage would not be rational in having absolute 
confidence that the world was just the way it looked.  We might well think that such an agent 
was by default entitled to believe that the world was the way it looked, but not that she was 




Moreover, it’s doubtful that an agent who had no concept of herself having a mistaken 
belief, or no inclination or capacity to reflect critically on her own beliefs at all, could correctly 
be categorized as ideally rational.  There may be some relatively thin sense of rationality that 
abstracts away from second-order reflection on an agent’s beliefs.
19
  But critical reflection on 
one’s beliefs is not just something peripheral to rational belief-management--it seems to be a 
central component of what it is to believe rationally in the fullest sense.   And even if we should 
hesitate to require much in the way of actual second-order reflection, it would seem that if an 
agent did not reflect on her beliefs at all, and if her beliefs were such that they would be 
undermined if she did reflect, the agent’s beliefs would not be ideally rational.  If that’s right, 
then it would seem that ideally rational beliefs would be sensitive to second-order considerations 
of the sort we’ve been discussing.  So I don’t think that the tension among our principles can be 
avoided by positing unselfconscious but ideally rational agents. 
I won’t take a stand here on whether the three principles are, in the end, jointly satisfiable, 
either by an omniscient God or by some lesser being who falls short of complete omniscience.  
But at this point, I don’t see a way of imagining an idealized agent who satisfies the principles 
and also can serve as a useful model for studying the question of how non-extreme degrees of 
belief should be constrained by logical structure.  So I’d like to turn now to examine the 
following question: supposing that there is no useful model of an ideally rational agent who 
satisfies the three principles, what implications does this have for the study of formal constraints 
on rationality? 
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7. Rational Ideals without IRAs 
                                                                                                                                                             
any reflection on an agent’s beliefs, from a better kind, “reflective knowledge,” which does. 
The suggestion that rationality might require violating coherence raises a question about what we 
should say about the agent--perhaps an imaginary agent with unlimited cognitive powers but 
limited evidence--who does take self-doubt into account appropriately, and thus violates 
probabilistic coherence?  There seem to be two possibilities.  First, one could say that, since 
such an agent’s beliefs would not completely respect logic, the agent would not be ideally 
rational.  On this view, ideal rationality simply could not in general be achieved by an agent who 
reacted to limited evidence in the best possible way (though perhaps it could be achieved by 
God).  A second option would be to say that, insofar as such an agent achieved the best possible 
beliefs given her evidence, the agent would be ideally rational.  On this view, one would 




Now I’m not sure that the difference between these two views is much more than verbal.  
One may see “ideal rationality” as forming the best possible beliefs given one’s evidence; or one 
may see it as perfectly exemplifying all rational ideals.  But it is important to see that even if one 
calls the incoherent agent ideally rational, one is not thereby denying that coherence is a rational 
ideal.  We’re quite familiar with other ideals that operate as values to be maximized, yet  whose 
maximization must in certain cases be balanced against, or otherwise constrained by, other 
values.  In scientific theory choice, simplicity and fit with the data are plausible examples of 
balancing.  In ethics, promoting well-being and respecting rights may illustrate a different sort of 
way in which one ideal constrains another.  And tension between ideals has been advocated in 
epistemology, by those who think we should choose our beliefs (in the all-or-nothing sense) so as 
to maximize true beliefs while also minimizing false ones.
20
  In all of these cases, the fact that 
ideals can be in tension with one another does not undermine their status as ideals.  So we can 
still see (LOGIC) as a rational ideal once we see how it is to be constrained by (EVIDENCE) and 
(INTEGRATION). 
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 Thanks to Don Fallis for reminding me of this example. 
Because of the particular way in which these three ideals interact, there turns out to be a 
strange way in which the mere possibility of epistemic misadventure implies an actual epistemic 
imperfection.  The (INTEGRATION)-mandated interaction between our first-order beliefs about 
logic and our second-order beliefs about ourselves results in something that might be called 
Murphy’s Law for epistemology.  The usual version of Murphy’s Law states that if it’s possible 
for something to go wrong, it will.  The epistemic cousin says that if it’s possible that something 




thinking about some theorem T), then something has actually gone epistemically wrong (my 
belief about T falls short of some rational ideal).  For either I’m certain of T, in which case my 
belief fails to reflect appropriately the possibility that I’ve made a cognitive error, or I’m 
uncertain about T, in which case my belief fails to respect logic. 
What implications does this have for our theorizing about formal conditions on rational 
belief?  If we agree that all the rational ideals cannot be simultaneously realized by a 
non-omniscient agent, can we still use idealized agents in thinking about how logic should 
constrain rational belief?  If so, will the standard arguments supporting formal conditions on 
rational belief be affected? 
I think that we may continue to use idealized agents in studying formal conditions on 
rational belief.  One way to do this is simply to ignore the fact we’ve been focusing on: that the 
standard idealized agent is violating certain strictures about taking self-doubt into account.  We 
could also, more self-consciously, suppose that an agent was cognitively unlimited, in the sense 
that she could achieve probabilistic coherence, but then stipulate that either (a) she didn’t have 
any second-order beliefs, or (b) she was certain that she was ideally rational, or (c) she didn’t 
take the possibility of her rational imperfection as a reason to be less than fully confident of 
logical theorems.  Having conceived of our agent in any of these ways, we could then consider 
arguments that such an agent should have probabilistically coherent beliefs.  In one of these 
ways, it seems to me that we could still run standard arguments based on rational constraints on 
preferences, or based on invulnerability to Dutch Books. 
If we do this, we will have to understand what we are doing in a way that departs from the 




can not, in these cases, think of the imaginary agent as ideally rational.  For the agent would be 
irrationally ignoring or rejecting epistemically relevant possibilities, or failing to take them into 
account rationally in adjusting her beliefs.  Nevertheless, the fact that one is not considering the 
agent as ideally rational does not, I think, undermine the agent’s value as a device to help think 
about a particular dimension of rationality: how logical structure should constrain degrees of 
belief.  
This can be seen by reflecting on the purpose of imagining idealized agents.  The 
purpose of the idealization is in part to abstract away from certain human cognitive limitations, 
and thus to open up the possibility--which is closed off for agents such as us--of satisfying 
conditions such as probabilistic coherence.  And the idealization should also abstract away from 
other interfering factors.  For example, a Dutch Book argument may assume that the imagined 
agent values money linearly, and exclusively.  The point of this assumption is not that it’s 
particularly rational to value money this way--the purpose is just to isolate one central way in 
which beliefs and preferences relate to one another.  Now if I’m right, it turns out that one thing 
that can interfere with an agent’s beliefs respecting logic completely is the sort of (rational) 
self-doubt we’ve been examining.  In stipulating away considerations of (even rational) 
self-doubt, we create a situation in which the logical constraint on belief can be studied in 
isolation. 
It is important to remember that considerations about the beliefs of ideal thinkers should 
not anyway be thought of as providing a reductive analysis of the concept of a rational ideal.  
The idea is not that we take a condition to be a rational ideal in virtue of the fact that the 




in tension with one another (at least for agents with limited information) we may reasonably 
allow one rational ideal to be violated in order to study another under limited-information 
conditions.  So the interest of the idealized-agent-based arguments would not be vitiated by 
acknowledging that the agents involved were not, after all, ideally rational.  If coherence can be 
supported by arguments based on this sort of model agent, that tells in favor of taking it as a 
rational ideal. 
But how could the envisioned sort of ideal have the right sort of evaluative implications 
for humans?  Once we admit that our coherent idealized agent is not actually ideally rational, 
doesn’t the whole exercise lose its epistemic significance? 
I think that once we see the structure of epistemic ideals in the way I’ve been urging, we 
can see that this is not a problem.  It’s always been clear that the sort of evaluative principle in 
question--e.g., the more coherent an agent’s beliefs are, the better--must be understood as subject 
to a ceteris paribus clause rooted in the limitations of an agent’s cognitive system.  For example, 
if improving coherence precluded gathering evidence, or required becoming a paranoid 
schizophrenic, then ceteris wouldn’t be paribus, and the agent’s beliefs would be less rational if 
she took the more coherent option.
21
  What the above discussion makes clear is that the ceteris 
paribus conditions must be understood to encompass another dimension.  It’s not just that our 
human fleshly limitations might happen to impose epistemic costs on maximizing certain 
epistemic desiderata.  Conflict among epistemic desiderata turns out to flow as well from 
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 Zynda (1996) defends probabilistic coherence as an ideal which imposes prima facie 




something much more general: it turns out that our very status as beings with limited information 
places some epistemic desiderata at odds with others. 
So even for us, it still makes sense to say that the more coherent our beliefs are, the better, 
ceteris paribus.  But the ceteris paribus conditions make reference to other epistemic ideals.  
And if the only way of achieving the probabilistically correct attitude toward some claim T 
would involve embracing irrational beliefs about my own logical invincibility, or violating the 
principle that my object-level beliefs should cohere with my meta-level beliefs about the 
reliability of the cognitive processes behind those object-level beliefs, then adopting the coherent 
attitude toward T might well render my beliefs less rational. 
So: if all this is right, then the tension among epistemic ideals, at least for agents with 
limited information, requires us to reconceptualize the sorts of ideal agents often considered in 
studying formal constraints on degrees of belief, but it doesn’t undermine their usefulness.  And 
the fact that the ideal of probabilistic coherence may be constrained by other epistemic ideals, 
and not just by human limitations, doesn’t undermine its status as an epistemic ideal. 
However, I do worry that other aspects of formal epistemology might not be left 
undisturbed by the problem I’ve been discussing.  The classic Bayesian view combines a 
probabilistic coherence requirement with a claim about how beliefs are informed by evidence.  
Conditionalization, and Jeffrey’s generalization of it, are the two standard formal accounts of 
how evidence bears on belief.  Both of these accounts presuppose probabilistic coherence.   
One might, of course, study these formal accounts of accommodating evidence by the 
method I’ve just recommended for studying formal constraints on an agent’s simultaneous 




agents should not be thought of as ideally rational.  And I think that this might well be very 
useful for studying many cases of evidence bearing on belief.  It might even allow us to model 
cases where some evidential sources undermine others.  So a probabilistically coherent ideal 
agent who employed conditionalization might allow one to model how strongly I should believe 
that it’s four o’clock, given that my watch says it is, and given information about my watch’s 
unreliability. 
But I don’t yet see how this would allow us to model the way my belief in T should be 
affected by evidence that Jocko has drugged my coffee.  Stipulating probabilistic coherence 
gives the wrong result: the probability of T, conditional on any evidence at all, will still be 1.  
The strategy of abstracting away from the conditions imposed by (EVIDENCE) and 
(INTEGRATION) will not work here, since those conditions are centrally important in 
determining how evidence about my being drugged affects the level of credence in T it is rational 
for me to have.  So it seems to me that the tension among our epistemic ideals does pose a 
problem for traditional formal ways of characterizing how evidence bears on rational belief. 
I think that this problem might turn out to be difficult to solve, especially formally.  This 
is because the solution would seem to have to respect all three of the principles; and as we’ve 
seen, the principles are in some tension with one another.  And the correct way of balancing or 
constraining one ideal by another is likely to prove difficult to capture in a formal system.  
I don’t want to argue that this problem can’t be solved.  One might, for example, try the 
sort of tactic Dan Garber (1983) proposed for handling one version of the old evidence problem.  
Garber thought the problem stemmed from the assumption of logical omniscience, and so to 




agents to be less than certain of them.  So one might try saying that the credence I should have 
that T is the probability that the sentence “T” is true, given that I seem to have a proof of it and 
that I know I have been drugged in a certain way. 
This might seem to give the right result in a circumscribed local way.  But even this type 
of model presupposes that the agent is probabilistically coherent over a large range of 
claims--this is needed for the conditionalization-based mechanism to apply.  Garber’s particular 
version assumes that the agent is certain of at least all truth-functional tautologies.  But I see no 
reason to think that proofs of truth-functional tautologies should be exempt from the effects of 
Jocko’s drugs. 
Moreover, I suspect that this sort of approach--at least in a simple form--would end up 
divorcing rational belief too sharply from logic.  Even if we restrict our attention to T, and 
suppose that it’s not a truth-functional tautology, the envisioned mechanism would seem to 
render irrelevant the actual cogency of the agent’s reasoning in proving T.  Her proof would 
enter into determining the rationality of her degree of credence in T only as an apparent proof.  
The fact that T really is a logical truth would have no direct impact on the question of how much 
rational confidence it merited.  Whether certain inferences were logically correct would have no 
direct impact on the rationality of beliefs supported by those inferences. 
The problem with this is especially clear if we think about cases of much milder reasons 
for doubt. Suppose that Cherry is an excellent reasoner, while Kelly is a poor reasoner, and that 
the two are separately thinking about some matter.  Cherry, through her usual flawless 
reasoning, becomes highly confident that P.  Kelly, through her usual logical blunders, also 




as more rational than Kelly’s.  And this remains true even if we add that Cherry’s and Kelly’s 
reasons for self-doubt are equivalent (perhaps neither has been given much feedback on her 
cognitive performance--they both happen to have discovered a few checkbook-balancing errors) 
and they have the same generally positive assessment of their own reasoning abilities.  While the 
rationality of an agent’s belief does depend on the agent’s second-order assessment of her 
reliability, it also depends on other things, including the first-order reasoning on which the belief 
is based. 
Of course, these worries are only preliminary, and it remains to be seen how difficult a 
problem we’re left with.  But if the arguments we’ve been looking at are correct, whatever 
account we end up giving of the way beliefs should be informed by evidence will have to take 
into account the interaction among epistemic ideals that we’ve been examining--in particular, the 
way that what it’s rational for an agent to believe in general is constrained by what it’s rational 
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